130. In the military organization of Japan the responsibility for controlling and directing subordinates is divided into two categories, according to the nature of the matter concerned.
(1) The first category covers matters which arise within the Chain of command of the Supreme Command; that is to say, matters concerning strategy, security, transport, and the treatment of prisoners of war during the period of their transportation to P.O.W. camps established by the Minister of War. All these matters fall within the category relating to the system of jurisdictional responsibility of the Supreme Command, and therefore the final responsibility involved in these matters rests with the Chief of the General Staff. Citing examples from events in this trial, the occurrences which took place on the Malay Peninsula, on the Bataan Peninsula, and the affairs which occurred en route on transport vessesl are matters which occured prior to the internment of prisoners in the P.O.W. camps established by the Minister of War, and, therefore, fall within the jurisdiction of the individuals in the chain of command of the Supreme Command directly concerned.
(2) The second category covers matters which occur within the jurisdictional authority of the Minister of War. For example, the treatment of prisoners of war after internment at Detention Camps, established by the Minister of War, or the treatment of civilian internees interned in the war zones, except for China, are of this classification. Consequently, the treatment, for example, of the war prisoners employed in the construction of the Burma-Siamese Railway, falls within the jurisdiction of the War Minister.
With respect to the second category I assume administrative responsibility as Minister of War for the period from the beginning of the Pacific War up to 22 July 1944.
Regarding the affairs in the first category, I take administrative responsibility incumbent on the Supreme Command as the Chief of the General Staff from February 1944 to July 1944.
Should there be any questions concerning foreign affairs such as protests from enemy countries, or through the international Red Cross, during the period of 1 September to 17 September 1942, I also take administrative responsibilities as the Minister of Foreign Affairs.
Should there be any incidents involving the treatment of civilian internees in Japan proper during the period from 3 December 1941 to 17 February 1942, I also assume administrative responsibility in my capacity as Minister of Home Affairs.
Further, as Prime Minister and concurrently as War Minister I am politically responsible for matters relating to the promulgation of the P.O.W. punishment law. However, the question of my legal responsibility or criminal liability for these matters is entirely one for this Tribunal to determine, and I have nothing whatever to say on this point other than to state frankly that at no time during my entire career did I ever contemplate the commission of a criminal act.
131. In the following I shall cover some of the issues which arose in connection with the treatment of Prisoners of War while I occupied the post of War Minister. In regard to prisoners of war as well as to civilian internees and inhabitants in occupied territories, I gave orders in accordance with the P.O.W. Treatment Regulations (Exh. 1965, Page 3) and P.O.W. Service Regulations (Exh. 1965, Page 14) prohibiting maltreatment and imposition of forced labor, and directed that they should be treated with humanity according to the principles of international law and the regulations. Additionally, in January of 1941, by War Ministry Instructions No.1, issued the “Field Service Instructions” (Senjinkun) in which directions were given to all army officers, soldiers and civilian employees of the Army as to their behaviour at the front. (3Xh. 3069) Everyone going to the front during the Pacific War was given a copy of this “Field Service Instruction” and a thorough dissemination of the spirit of the instructions was aimed at. (Testimony of the Witness, Ichinoe, Record 27,433). My views as War Minister on matters which the Prosecution alleges were unlawful acts are given in Exhibit 1981-A.
132. As to the Geneva Protocol, it was not ratified by Japan. As a matter of fact the Japanese conception regarding prisoners of war differs from that of Europeans and Americans. Furthermore, differences in every day living conditions, as well as customs and manners between Japanese and other nationals, together with the enormous number of Prisoners covering such a vast area and embracing many different races, plus the acute shortage of various materials and supplies, made it impossible for this country to apply the Geneva Protocol verbatim.
The statement that the Japanese conception regarding P.O.W.'s differs from that of Europeans and Americans means that from ancient times the Japanese have deemed it most degrading to be taken prisoner, and all combatants have been instructed to choose death rather than be captured as a P.O.W. Such being the case it was considered that a ratification of the Geneve Protocol would lead public opinion to believe that the authorities encouraged them to be captured as prisoners, and there was fear that such a ratification might conflict with the traditional idea concerning P.O.W.'s and this fear had not been dispelled up to the beginning of this war. In response to an inquiry from the Foreign Office regarding the Geneva Protocol the War Ministry replied that although it could not announce complete adherence to this Protocol, it perceived no objection to the application, with necessary reservations, of its stipulations concerning Prisoners of War. In January 1942 the Foreign Minister announced through the Ministries of Switzerland and Argentina that Japan would apply the Protocol modification (Junyo) (Exhibits 1469-1957). By the term “aply with modifications” (Junyo) the Japanese Government meant that it would apply the Geneva Protocol with such changes as might be necessary to conform to the domestic law and regulations as well as the practical requirements of existing conditions. This was stated clearly in the note of the Japanese Government, dated 22 April 1944, made in reply to the protest of the American Government. (Def. Doc. 2775). The Army's interpretation of conditions was identical, and action was taken accordingly. The P.O.W. Treatment Regulations and other rules are consistent with the above statement.
