FORMATION OF THE SECOND KONOYE CABINET AND THE INTERNAL AND EXTERNAL SITUATION AT THAT TIME
第二次近衛内閣の成立と当時の内外の情勢
4. I shall continue my testimony now with certain pertinent facts connected with the formation of the Second KONOYE Cabinet, at which time I first held a position of political responsibility. About one month previous to that administrative change, June 1940, I was on an official tour in Manchuria, inspecting manoeuvers in my capacity as Inspector General of the Army Air Force. On the 17th of July I received orders from the War Minister to report to Tokyo and accordingly left from the Mukden Air Field arriving at Tachikawa Air Field Tokyo at 9:40 P.M. on the 18th, after making one stop-over at Heijo en route. I immediately visited the official residence of the Minister of War and received reports concerning the circumstances relative to the fall of the previous Cabinet, and was informed also that the Emperor had ordered Prince KONOYE to form the succeeding Cabinet and that I was recommended as the candidate for War Minister, The impression I received on that occasion was that Premier-designate Prince KONOYE was approaching the formation of the new Cabinet with the utmost circumspection. That is to say, I understood that he was concerned especially with the basic national policy which this country should pursue in the future, laying particular emphasis on obtaining a closer connection between the Army and the Navy, proper coordination of the Supreme Command and the Administration of the Government, and similarly related problems, all in view of the fact that the country was then in the midst of the China Incident.
四、先ず私が初めて政治責任を担う地位に立った第二次近衛内閣の成立に関連するいくつかの事実について証言を続けます。あの政権交代の約一ヶ月前の一九四〇年六月、私は陸軍航空総監として満洲に公務出張し、演習を視察しておりました。七月一七日、陸軍大臣から帰京の命令を受け、奉天飛行場を出発し、途中平城に一泊し、一八日午後九時四〇分に東京の立川飛行場に到着致しました。直ちに陸軍大臣官邸を訪れ、前内閣の崩壊に関わる事情の報告を受けると共に、次期内閣組閣の大命が近衛公に下ったこと、また私が陸軍大臣候補として推挙されたことを知らされ、その際、近衛公が新内閣の組閣に極めて慎重に臨んでいるという印象を受けました。即ち、その当時、支那事変の渦中にあった我が国の実情に鑑み、陸海軍の連携強化、統帥と国務との適切な調整、その他類似の問題に特に重点を置き、我が国が今後追求すべき基本的な国策について殊に懸念を抱いていると私は了解致しました。
5. That evening, I received a summons from Premier-designate KONOYE, and on the following day (19 July) at 3 P.M. I called on him at his private residence at Ogikubo, Suginami Ward, Tokyo. There were present at this meeting Prince KONOYE, Navy Minister Zengo Yoshida, Foreign Minister candidate Yosuke MATSUOKA and myself. No notes of the proceedings were taken as it was essentially a private meeting assembled for the purpose of reaching some agreement of opinion concerning national defense, diplomacy, internal administration and the like. This is the meeting which later was referred to popularly as the “Ogikubo Conference,” The Premier-designate proposed that in view of the past course of events, the national policy hereafter should emphasize the solution of the China Incident, for which purpose, among others, it was essential that the relations between the Supreme Command and the Government should be better coordinated, and, further, that there should be a closer harmony between the Army and the Navy. All present expressed complete agreement with these propositions and promised to do their best in that direction. Some practical political problems were also taken up, and under this heading the following policies were discussed: the renovation of the domestic political organizations in view of the current trends in domestic and foreign affairs, expediting the solution of the China Incident, diplomatic innovation, the perfection of national defense, and other pertinent matters. Although I do not remember all the details under discussion at this meeting, the essentials formed the neucleus of what was later presented as the “outline of basic national policy“ and agreed upon by the Cabinet. No conditional reservations were made by the Army or the Navy in joining the Cabinet, although I did express my personal wish that the solution of the China Incident be accelerated and that plans for national defense be perfected. The meeting ended on a general agreement of opinion but no particular decisions were made on national policy. There was no discussion regarding the selection of cabinet members, this being left entirely to Prince KONOYE, and we others merely received reports from him as to the outcome. The statement by the Prosecution, therefore, that “an authoritative foreign policy program” was decided upon at this meeting (I.P.S, Doc, 0003) is entirely without foundation. The selection of Cabinet members by Prince KONOYE was completed in due course, and the Imperial Investiture ceremony of the new Cabinet took place at 8 P.M. 22 July.
五、その日の晩、近衛次期首相から呼び出され、翌日（七月一九日）午後三時、杉並区荻窪の私邸を訪ねました。この席には近衛公、吉田善吾海軍大臣、松岡洋右次期外務大臣、そして私が出席致しました。これは国防、外交、内政等について意見の一致を見るために開かれた私的な会談でありましたので、議事録は取られませんでした。これが後に世間で「荻窪会議」と呼ばれる会談であり、次期首相は過去の経緯に鑑み、今後の国策は支那事変の解決に重点を置くべきであり、そのためには統帥と政府との関係の調整を図ること、さらには陸海軍の協調を図ることが不可欠であると提唱されました。出席者全員がこれらの提案に全面的に賛同し、その方向で最善を尽くすことを約束致しました。また、いくつかの具体的な政治問題も取り上げられ、この標題で以下の政策が議論されました。内外情勢の動向を考慮した国内体制の刷新、支那事変解決の促進、外交の刷新、国防を盤石とすること、及びその他の関連事項などがそれであります。私はこの会議で議論された内容の詳細すべてを覚えてはおりませんが、その主要事項は、後に閣議に於て提議され合意された「基本国策要綱」の骨子をなすものであります。陸海軍は入閣に関して条件を付けることはございませんでしたが、私は支那事変の解決を早め、国防計画を盤石なものにするという個人的な希望を述べました。会談は大筋の意見の一致を見て終了致しましたが、国策についての決定は特にはございませんでした。閣僚の人選についても議論はなく、すべては近衛公に一任され、我々はその結果について近衛公から報告を受けただけでありました。よって、この会議で「権威ある外交政策綱領」が決定された、という検察の発言(検察文書〇〇〇三号)はまったく根拠のないものであります。近衛公による閣僚の人選は予定通りに完了し、七月二二日午後八時に親任式が行なわれました。
As War Minister, I considered three principles for my future course of action: (1) To exert unstinted effort toward the solution of the China Incident, (2) To establish rigorous control over the internal discipline of the Army, and, (3) To work for closor coordination between the Supreme Command and the Government, and between the Army and the Navy.
陸軍大臣として、私は今後の行動方針として三つの原則を定めました。即ち、(一) 支那事変の解決に全力を尽くすこと、(二) 陸軍部内の厳格な統制を確立すること、そして、(三) 政府と統帥並びに陸軍と海軍の緊密な連携･協調を図ること、これであります。
6. It is necesssry at this point to touch upon the prevailing aspects of domestic and foreign affairs, in the first place, the China Incident had been uninterrupted for three years without any signs in sight of a solution, with American and British aid to Chungking becoming more and more intensified. This support presented the chief obstacle to the conclusion of the China Incident, and we could not but contemplate it with deep concern. In the second place, the war in Europe had, since its outbreak, brought about serious repercussions to the world in general. The European powers who had interests in East Asia, namely France and the Netherlands, had dropped out of the field of battle. With Britain in a critical position, the possibility of America entering the war became more end more apparent. In that event there was imminent danger of the war spreading to East Asia, and it was vital, therefore, that Japan take some active measures to prepare for that contingency. In the third place, the economic strangulation of Japan by America and Britain was increasing in severity with each passing day. Thus we were confronted by all these grave disturbances in addition to the difficult problem of China.
六、ここで当時の内外の情勢について触れておかねばなりません。第一に、支那事変は三年もの間続いており解決の兆しさえも見えておらず、重慶に対する米英の支援はますます強化されておりました。この支援は支那事変の終結に対する最大の障害であり、我々はこれに深い憂慮の念を抱かざるを得ませんでした。第二に、ヨーロッパにおける戦争は勃発以来、世界全体に深刻な影響を及ぼしておりました。東アジアに利権を持つ欧州諸国、即ち仏国と蘭国は戦場から撤退し、英国が危殆に瀕するに伴い、米国が参戦する可能性はいよいよ濃厚になっておりました。そうなりますれば、戦争が東亜に拡大する差し迫った危険があり、従って日本はそのような事態に備えて何らかの積極的な措置を講じる必要がありました。第三に、米国と英国による日本への経済的圧迫は日増しに深刻さを増しておりました。斯くの如く我々は中国の困難な問題に加えて、これらすべての深刻な障害に直面していたのであります。
Coming now to domestic affairs. First of all, the proposal concerning a new political order advocated by Prince KONOYE appeared to be supported by the whole nation. The various political parties and factions were in sympathy with the movement, and of their own volition dissolved themselves or they were in the process of dissolution. Then, secondly, in the field of economic and political thought the concept of a new order was fast gathering momentum, while in the third place, with each new form of pressure against us by America, Britain, and other nations, public opinion was gradually swinging away from liberalism towards nationalism.
さて、内政についてでありますが、第一に、近衛公の提唱する政治新体制は全国民の支持を得ているようでありました。各党各派はこの動静に応じて自主的に解消、或いは解消の途にありました。第二に、経済･政治思想の分野では新体制の思想が急速に勢いを増し、第三には、米英その他諸国からの圧迫が増すごとに、世論は次第に自由主義から国家主義へと転じつつありました。
